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I. Introduction
Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) will require the development of emissions
abatement technologies that are not currently available or that are not currently cost-effective.
While market mechanisms such as carbon pricing must play a central role in stimulating the
development of these technologies, governmental policy aimed at fostering these technologies
and lowering their costs must also play a part. Economic analysis suggests that both types of
policies will form part of an optimal greenhouse gas control portfolio.1
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Of the many GHG-reducing technologies discussed, this article will focus on two types: (i) those
to capture and dispose of a stream of GHG emissions, or carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technology; and (ii) technology to capture or avoid the venting, fugitive emission, and flaring of
natural gas (collectively VFF). Together, these two classes of technologies considered in this
article are referred to as carbon management technologies, or "CMTs." There are many
technologies that reduce GHGs, but these CMTs build on an existing infrastructure associated
with upstream energy production, and hence do not require drastic changes in infrastructure or
behavior. Government support for these CMTs has been provided on a relatively ad hoc basis.
This article provides an analysis of the legal ramifications of policies to support these CMTs, so
as to afford guidance to policymakers and aid in providing a rational, coherent, consistent set of
GHG policies. Towards that end, we analyze the international trade and international investment
law implications of different policies to support these CMTs.
This article surveys policies to support CMTs, and discusses the international investment law and
international trade law implications. The discussion is broken down into two sections: how
international investment law and international trade law may constrain CMT-promoting policies,
and how they may aid them. International investment law or international trade law might
constrain CMT-promoting policies if, for example, carbon intensive investors or states could
argue that these CMT-promoting policies adversely affect the financial viability of their
investments2 or violate a World Trade Organization (WTO) rule.3 On the other hand,
international investment law and international trade law could promote or reinforce CMTpromoting policies.4 This could be the case if, for example, they shield investors in CMTs
against regulatory changes that could affect the financial viability of their projects. While a
common notion exists that international investment law and international trade law
predominantly constrain environmental policy, this is not necessarily accurate. This article will,
in addition to identifying the potential constraints, identify ways that CMT-promoting polices
could benefit from international investment law or international trade law.
II. Incentives for Carbon Management Technologies
This article consciously takes a technological perspective, and focuses on policies to facilitate the
development of technologies to reduce emissions in the upstream energy production sector. As
such, this article will not address many broader issues and problems pertaining to the overall
question of how to reduce the carbon footprint of developed economies. We do not discuss
broader GHG-reduction policies such as conservation and efficiency measures,5 nor do we

2

Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change,
27 JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 333, 335 (2009).
3
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 31 (2009).
4
See, e.g., Anatole Boute, Combating Climate Change through Investment Arbitration, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 613
(2012); TRACEY EPPS & ANDREW GREEN, RECONCILING TRADE AND CLIMATE: HOW THE WTO CAN HELP ADDRESS
CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010).
5
For reviews that discuss a broader range of policy measures see, e.g., Richard Ottinger et al., Renewable Energy in
National Legislation: Challenges and Opportunities, in BEYOND THE CARBON ECONOMY: ENERGY LAW IN
TRANSITION 183 (Don Zillman et al. eds., 2008); Catherine Banet, The Use of Market-Based Instruments in the
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discuss other forms of GHG-reducing technologies. This article will only make a brief point
about carbon pricing and trade law but eschew a lengthy discussion, as the many policy aspects
and implications of carbon pricing have been treated extensively elsewhere.6
II.A. Carbon Management Technologies
II.A.1. Carbon Capture and Storage
CCS reduces CO2 emissions by capturing them from a point source7 and injecting the captured
CO2 into a suitable geological formation (depleted oil or gas reservoirs, deep saline aquifers or
unminable coal seams) from which they will not enter the atmosphere and contribute to climate
change.8 While much of the CCS discussion has centered upon the electricity generation
industry, CCS also offers promise for other industrial applications9 such as the upstream energy
production sector that is the focus of this article.
Research is underway to improve the technology involved in each of the three links in the CCS
chain: capture, transport and storage. A few full-scale commercial projects already successfully
store CO2 streams captured from natural gas production in deep saline formations.10 Others
involve the combination of carbon capture and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) processes in order
to add a financial incentive for upstream capture.11 EOR involves CO2 injection into a depleting
field in order to maximize oil production by reducing oil viscosity and improving geological
porosity.12 Since permanent storage of CO2 is not the primary goal in EOR undertakings, they
often lack monitoring regimes, but they do provide important insights into techniques for future
Transition from a Carbon-Based Economy, in BEYOND THE CARBON ECONOMY: ENERGY LAW IN TRANSITION 183,
207 (Don Zillman et al. eds., 2008).
6
See, e.g., SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST OUR HANG-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CLIMATE
POLICY 15-17, 20-22, 191-194 (2011) [hereinafter HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX].
7
See also Klaus S Lackner, Comparative Impacts of Fossil Fuels and Alternate Energy Sources, in CARBON
CAPTURE: SEQUESTRATION AND STORAGE 1, 28-31 (R E Hester and R M Harrison eds., 2010) (discussing the fact
that direct air capture technology is also being explored and should it become feasible on a large scale, it would not
be restricted to point sources but could also provide a mechanism to correct for past emissions and for generalized
sources such as the transportation industry).
8
See, e.g., Nick Riley, Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, in CARBON CAPTURE: SEQUESTRATION AND STORAGE
155, 156, 170 (R E Hester and R M Harrison eds., 2010) (discussing saline aquifers and depleted hydrocarbon sites
as having the largest potential volume and the most well known capacity respectively).
9
International Energy Agency & United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Technology Roadmap:
Carbon Capture and Storage in Industrial Applications, 6 (2011), http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=1000821
[hereinafter CCS Industry Roadmap].
10
See, e.g., K Michael et al., Geological storage of CO2 in saline aquifers – A review of the experience from
existing storage operations, 4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 659, 660 (2010)
(discussing projects undertaken in Salah, Algeria (2004), Sleipner (1996), Norway, and Snøhvit (2008), Norway).
11
See, e.g., Global CCS Institute, The Global Status of CCS: 2011, 11 (2011)
http://cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/22562/global-status-ccs-2011.pdf
[hereinafter
Global CCS Institute] (projects include: Val Verde Natural Gas Plant (1972), Shute Creek Gas Processing Facility
(1986), Century Plant (2010) and Great Plains Synfuels Plant/Weyburn-Midale Project (2000) in the U.S and
Canada).
12
See, e.g., Riley, supra note 8, at 165-168 (CO2 can also be injected into depleted gas fields (enhanced gas
recovery) or into coal or shale beds post-hydrofracing in order to displace additional methane (enhanced coal bed
methane recovery and shale gas technology). These technologies offer promising hydrocarbon recovery applications
but require additional research before they will significantly contribute to permanent CO2 storage requirements.).
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technological development.13 Some upstream natural gas extraction and hydrogen production
processes result in relatively pure streams of CO2. This reduces capture costs and makes these
processes well-placed to take advantage of CCS technology with significant cost savings.14
Technologically, CCS in the upstream energy industry is feasible, and future improvements
await the development of additional large-scale projects.15 In Canada, where oil production has
become the fastest-growing source of emissions,16 CCS projects such as the recently approved
Quest Project in Alberta, which will capture of 1.2 MtCO2 per year,17 will be vital to the
sustainability of Canada’s upstream oil industry.
Barriers to CCS implementation in the upstream energy industry exist, but they are not
insurmountable if addressed with appropriate policy instruments. These barriers include cost,18
long project lead-times for storage site identification,19 transportation infrastructure
development,20 a clear legal framework21 and public engagement.22
II.A.2. Gas venting, flaring and fugitive emissions
The technology already exists to significantly reduce VFF. Venting is the intentional release of
un-combusted natural gas in to the atmosphere. Fugitive emissions refer to the unintentional
emission of natural gas.23 Flaring is the intentional combustion of natural gas for disposal.24
Venting and fugitive emissions are direct releases of methane, while the primary product of
flaring is carbon dioxide. Therefore, venting and fugitive emissions are of greater climate change
concern per unit of volume of gas than flaring since methane (which typically represents more
than 80 percent of natural gas by volume), has a global warming potential that is 21 to 23 times
greater than carbon dioxide.25

13

Michael, supra note 10, at 664; Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 12, 17.
CCS Industry Roadmap, supra note 9, at 9; Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 37.
15
Michael, supra note 10, at 664-665; CCS Industry Roadmap, supra note 9, at 8-9.
16
Environment Canada, Canada’s Emissions Trends, 51 (2011), http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/E197D5E71AE3-4A06-B4FC-CB74EAAAA60F/CanadasEmissionsTrends.pdf.
17
AERCB Decision 008, Application for the Quest Carbon Capture and Storage Project – Radway Field, ¶¶ 7-8,
173-176 (Jul. 10, 2012) (Can.).
18
CCS Industry Roadmap, supra note 9, at 14, 16-18 (in order to drop global industry emissions by 11Gt CO2
compared to the baseline 2050 scenario, approximately US$250 billion is needed globally to deploy 268 projects in
the high-purity sector and US$175 billion is needed to deploy 88 projects in the refineries sector. This can be
compared to the approximately US$1250 billion required to deploy 14 projects in the iron and steel industry. These
estimates include infrastructure, transportation and storage costs).
19
Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 57.
20
Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 47.
21
CCS Industry Roadmap, supra note 9, at 29.
22
Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 95.
23
BC Oil and Gas Commission, Flaring, Incinerating and Venting Reduction Report for 2010, 7, 21 (2010)
http://www.bcogc.ca/document.aspx?documentID=1206 [hereinafter BCOGC].
24
Id. at 7.
25
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 212 (S Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (21 times greater);
Environmental Protection Agency, Methane: Questions and Answers: The Methane to Markets Partnership, (2010),
http://www.epa.gov/methane/qanda.html (23 times greater).
14
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The World Bank estimates that 140 bcm of natural gas was flared in 2011, a slight increase from
2010 and a reversal of what had been a declining profile of flaring.26 By and large, flaring is
avoided in developed producing countries that have the technology and infrastructure to capture
and utilize natural gas that would otherwise be flared. But venting and fugitive emissions is
common in all producing jurisdictions.27 The World Bank lists Russia, Nigeria, Iran and Iraq as
the world’s largest flaring states. In 2011, the USA became the fifth largest flaring country,
largely due to the dramatic increase in shale oil and gas production in North Dakota.28
In 2002 the World Bank partnered with others to launch the Global Initiative on Gas Flaring
Reduction (GGFR), a program to reduce natural gas flaring around the world, particularly in
developing countries.29 Clearly, the technology exists to reduce and even prevent venting and
flaring. Reports commissioned by the GGFR point to the importance of appropriate regulations
along with monitoring and enforcement procedures.30 Some producer states retain preemptive
rights to take associated gas, thereby removing any incentive for operators to invest in that gas.
Access to markets was also a problem in many countries due to the lack of physical
infrastructure and inadequate legal rules in the face of monopolistic vertically integrated state
owned energy utilities. And finally the reports suggested that attention needed to be given to
creating an appropriate mix of fiscal incentives in order to encourage investment.31
II.B. Measures Promoting Carbon Management Technologies
Governments face a number of policy choices when determining the most effective way of
promoting technology development and diffusion. Five policies, which could promote CMTs in
the upstream energy industry, are briefly introduced to form a framework for discussion.
II.B.1. Subsidies
Subsidies for capital investments, R&D funding, pilot project grants, capacity building grants,
tax exemptions and free emissions allowances under a cap-and-trade scheme may promote the
diffusion of target technologies. Financial support for pilot CCS projects and for capacity

26

The World Bank, Press Release: World Bank See Warring Sign in Gas Flaring Increase, (Jul. 3, 2012),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/07/03/world-bank-sees-warning-sign-gas-flaring-increase [hereinafter The
World Bank: Press Release].
27
See, e.g., Energy Resources Conservation Board, Upstream Petroleum Industry Flaring and Venting Report:
Industry Performance for Year Ending December 31, 2010, 1-3 (2011), http://www.ercb.ca/sts/ST60B-2011.pdf
(Alberta is a "best practices" jurisdiction, but still has solution gas VFF volumes of about 4.6 percent of production).
28
The World Bank: Press Release, supra note 26.
29
The World Bank, Global Gas Flaring Reduction a Public-Private Partnership: About GGFR (Sep. 11, 2012),
http://go.worldbank.org/Q7E8SP9J90.
30
World Bank Group, Regulation of Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: A Global Overview and Lessons from
International
Experience,
GGFR
REPORT
NUMBER
3
(2004),
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/07/16/000012009_20040716133951/Rend
ered/PDF/295540Regulati1aring0no10301public1.pdf [hereinafter GGFR REPORT 3]; see also Franz Gerner, Bent
Svensson & Sascha Djumena, Public Policy for the Private Sector: Gas Flaring and Venting, THE WORLD BANK
GROUP NOTE NUMBER 279 (Oct. 2004), http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/279gerner.pdf.
31
GGFR REPORT 3, supra note 30, at 22; Gerner, supra note 30, at 3.
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building research have been prominent parts of climate policy for over a decade.32 Much of this
funding has targeted the electricity generation industry,33 but governments of jurisdictions in
which fossil fuel extraction is particularly important, such as Norway, the European Union, the
United States, Canada and Australia are also prominent backers of upstream CCS projects. The
Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies program at MIT reports on its website the
development nine pilot projects incorporating EOR and 15 pilot projects involving permanent
storage in saline aquifers or depleted gas fields,34 the vast majority of which involve some
governmental funding. GHG policy built solely on technology-promoting subsidies would be
problematic. But subsidies may prove useful for early technology deployment.35
II.B.2. Regulations
The traditional approach to environmental law is to administratively establish performance
standards for certain common classes of emitters.36 These standards may not mandate the use of
a specific technology but instead set allowable emissions levels class-by-class and so result in
indirect technology promotion. For example, the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard sets
allowable average lifecycle GHG emissions for different fuel types.37 The European Fuel Quality
Directive (EFQD) sets a baseline standard based on fuel feed stocks and also offers incentives
for flaring reduction.38 The EFQD sets a high GHG value on Canadian oil sands crude. The
provincial Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board has established flaring limits that have
been internationally recognized for their effectiveness.39 Neighboring British Columbia’s Oil and
Gas Commission has also established standards that have helped reduce flaring emissions by
39% from 1996-2010.40

32

International Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage, 11 (2009) [hereinafter IEA
Roadmap] (public support of CCS demonstration projects (US$bn): United States: 3.4; EU: 1.5 (and 300m credits in
Emissions Trading Scheme); Australia: 1.65; Canada: 3.0; Norway: 0.2; Japan: 0.1); see also Global CCS Institute,
supra note 11, at 89-90 (direct financial support of CCS demonstration projects in 2010, including tax credits and
grants (US$bn): United States: 7.4; EU: 5.6; Australia: 4.1; Canada: 3.1; UK: 1.7; Norway: 1.0; Korea: 0.8;
Netherlands: 0.3).
33
Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 91-92 (76% of funding allocated to power projects).
34
MIT,
NON-POWER
PLANT
CARBON
DIOXIDE
CAPTURE
AND
STORAGE
PROJECTS,
http://sequestration.mit.edu/tools/projects/storage_only.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (the author's count from
reading the project descriptions and websites: all but four explicitly mention governmental funding or participation;
of these four, two receive governmental CO2 tax credits).
35
CCS Industry Roadmap, supra note 9, at 5.
36
See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY L. Q. 303, 358-364
(2004).
37
Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 17 CCR § 95482 (proposed regulation).
38
Draft Commission Directive ../../EC of [….] laying down calculation methods and reporting requirements
pursuant to Directive 98/70/ED of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the quality of petrol and
diesel fuels, D016937/03 in dossier CMTD(2012)0166, recitals 5, 7, 13, art. 3 (Feb. 23, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=search.dossierdetail&i4E3IvzVEe6K7czhtRYFvHaI4
f3TEUr8zQzZMBeU3winIDvf1TNPofuY6ToXhDSw [hereinafter EFQD Draft Directive].
39
See, e.g., Directive 060, Upstream Petroleum Industry Flaring, Incinerating and Venting (Can.), available at
http://www.ercb.ca/directives/Directive060.pdf.
40
Oil and Gas Activities Act: Drilling and Production Regulation, BC Reg. 282/2010 § 42 (Can.); BCOGC, supra
note 23, at 15.
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Regulatory approaches may also take the form of a specific practice requirement which mandates
use of a certain technology, such as the requirement that new coal-fired power plants must be
"CCS-ready."41 Broadly speaking, "CCS-ready" means that the plant is required to be able to
accommodate the storage, transport and retrofit for CCS, depending on the size and location of
the plant to be built.42 The Canadian federal agency Environment Canada has implemented a
new performance standard for new coal-fired power plants and existing power plants at the end
of their useful life (45 years)43 which is stringent enough to effectively require CCS, given
current technology options and costs.44 In the upstream energy industry, a CCS-ready
requirement could be imposed upon processes that produce a high-purity CO2 stream, such as
some methane natural gas streams and hydrogen production (from methane) used in bitumen
upgrading.
II.B.3. Removal of Trade Barriers
Environmental goods (such as CCS technologies, emissions scrubbers, renewable energy
technologies, and recycling and remediation technologies) are subject to high tariffs in many
countries. For example, Brazil, India, and China have tariffs ranging from 8.5 to 14.1 percent for
a selection of environmental goods.45 Further, bound tariffs on environmental goods worldwide
are estimated to average over 8 percent – much higher than the 3 percent average for other
goods.46 Reducing tariffs on environmental goods can make such goods cheaper in the importing
country, and therefore increase demand and improve environmental outcomes.47
II.B.4. Developing Infrastructure and Administrative Capacity
In some cases the successful diffusion of new technologies may require governments to adopt
measures that clarify the legal rights and obligations of parties or the form of an entitlement48 in
order to reduce legal risks (or at least allow parties to properly assess the nature or scale of the
risk), reduce transaction costs, and in some cases reduce the risk of a party abusing market
power. For example, in the context of CCS, government may find it appropriate to clarify the
following types of issues: pore space ownership, the applicable regulatory rules (e.g., whether
the government will apply the rules for EOR projects or develop sui generis rules) and the
41

See Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 126, 128, 130, 132 (Australia, EU, Japan and Norway are examples of
countries which require that future plants be CCS ready).
42
Global CCS Institute, supra note 11, at 8, 10-11.
43
Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-Fired Generation of Electricity Regulations (2012) C Gaz,
146:19 (Can.), available at http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2012/2012-09-12/html/sor-dors167-eng.html.
44
Andrew Sullivan, Federal government introduces regulations to progressively phase-out coal plants, (Sep. 12,
2010),
http://www.canadianenergylaw.com/2012/09/articles/climate-change/federal-government-introducesregulations-to-progressively-phaseout-coalplants/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CanadianEnergyLaw+%28Canadi
an+Energy+Law%29.
45
Trade and Environment Briefings: Trade in Environmental Goods, Policy Brief 6, 3 (Jun. 2012), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2012/06/trade-in-environmental-goods.pdf.
46
Id. at 2.
47
Alain-Desire Nimubona, Pollution Policy and Liberalization of Trade in Environmental Goods, ENVIRONMENTAL
AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS (forthcoming in 2012).
48
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-1092 (1972).
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treatment of long-term liability.49 Similarly, in order to reduce the risk of abuse of market power
in the context of CO2 storage sites and infrastructure governments may find it appropriate to
enact third party access rules.50
There may be a similar need to clarify background rules in the context of VFF since in some
countries, restricted access to the gas infrastructure is one of the major obstacles to the reduction
of gas flaring by oil producers. In Russia, for instance, limited access to the gas network by oil
producers in order to reduce the amount of ‘associated gas’ being flared is a controversial issue.51
Gazprom – the major gas producer in Russia – also controls the pipeline infrastructure and has
no interest in allowing access to competing gas producers. Some producers have launched claims
before the Federal Anti-monopoly Service of the Russian Federation in order to force third party
access to the infrastructure.
II.B.5. Carbon Pricing
Carbon pricing is widely viewed as being an effective and efficient instrument to reduce CO2
emissions.52 A carbon price may take the form of an explicit price, set by a carbon tax, or may
take the form of a market price in a cap-and-trade system of tradable allowances to emit. In
either case, emitting GHGs is no longer free. Carbon pricing is in effect in the European Union
in the form of its European Union Emissions Trading System, and carbon taxation is in effect in
various forms in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the UK, Australia, and the Canadian
province of British Columbia.53
Carbon pricing is considered a central element of any effort to make CCS cost-effective.54 CCS
has no purpose whatsoever if emitting GHGs bears no financial consequences. Financing CCS
investments thus requires a payback stream in the form of savings from avoiding a carbon tax by
49

For a discussion of these types of issues see, e.g., OECD & IEA, Legal Aspects of Storing CO2, Update and
Recommendations, (2007), http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/legal_aspects.pdf; N. Bankes et al., The
Legal Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage in Alberta, 45 ALBERTA LAW REVIEW 585 (2008); N. Bankes
and M. Roggenkamp, Legal Aspects of Carbon Capture and Storage, in BEYOND THE CARBON ECONOMY: ENERGY
LAW IN TRANSITION 339 (D.N. Zillman et al. eds., 2008); N. Bankes, Alberta’s New Carbon Capture and Storage
Legislation, 1 GREENHOUSE GASES: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 134 (2011).
50
For a discussion of TPA issues see Martha M. Roggenkamp, The Concept of Third Party Access Applied to CCS,
in LEGAL DESIGN OF CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL AND EU PERSPECTIVE (Martha M Roggenkamp & Edwin Woerdman eds., 2009) (discussing
DIRECTIVE 2009/31/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 April 2009 on
the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and
Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No
1013/2006 esp. articles 20 and 21); Nigel Bankes & Rick Nilson, Economic Regulation and the Design of a Carbon
Infrastructure for Alberta, in ENERGY NETWORKS AND THE LAW 231, 231-251 (Roggenkamp et al. eds., 2012).
51
See J. HENDERSON, NON-GAZPROM GAS PRODUCERS IN RUSSIA 164, 244 (2010).
52
See, e.g., Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009);
Daniel C. Esty & Steve Charnovitz, Green Rules to Drive Innovation: Charging for carbon can inspire
conservation, fuel competition, and enhance competitiveness, 90 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 120, 123 (2012);
HSU, A CASE FOR A CARBON TAX, supra note 6, at 192.
53
David G. Duff and Shi-Ling Hsu, Carbon Taxation in Theory and Practice, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION VOL. VII 261 (2010).
54
Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage, 10 (Aug. 2010)
http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/sequestration/ccstf/CCSTaskForceReport2010.pdf.
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avoiding emissions. That said, this article will not discuss in depth the general subject of carbon
pricing and the economic, political, and social aspects of carbon pricing, which is extensivey
treated elsewhere.55 This article will only make a brief point about trade law and carbon pricing
to illustrate an interaction between CMTs and international trade law.
III. International Investment Law and International Trade Law That May Constrain
Policies to Promote Carbon Management Technologies
International investment law and international trade law are commonly thought to pose
constraints on environmental policies, and this is no less true of climate policies. Expansive
interpretations of the standards of protection afforded foreign investors in international
investment law, as well as various uncertainties regarding the interpretation of international trade
agreements may have a constraining effect on governments implementing CMT-promoting
policies. The following section considers potential constraints on CMT-promoting policies such
as those described in Section II above.
III.A. International Investment Law and the Regulatory "Chill"
Many of the aspirational goals outlined in international investment agreements, including
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), highlight the role of international investment in achieving
objectives such as the effective utilization of economic resources, improving living standards and
the protection of the environment.56 However, the robust protections provided to foreign
investors and their investments under such agreements may also have a constraining effect on
governments trying to contribute to climate change mitigation goals by promoting CMTs.
Past decisions of some investor-state arbitral tribunals have taken an investor-friendly position in
their interpretation of the standards of protection afforded foreign investors under international
investment agreements (IIAs). This has been especially true with respect to interpretation of the
"fair and equitable treatment" standard.57 In particular, a number of cases in the NAFTA context,
including Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States,58 have triggered concern about the
policy space afforded governments to develop and regulate their economies while protecting
their environment.59 Expansive interpretations of investment treaty protections may be troubling
55

See, e.g., Gilbert Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009);
Esty, supra note 52, at 123; HSU, A CASE FOR A CARBON TAX, supra note 6, at 192.
56
See,
e.g.,
2012
US
Model
Bilateral
Investment
Treaty,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter US Model BIT]; Energy Charter Treaty,
preamble,
1995,
2080
U.N.T.S.
95,
34
I.L.M.
360,
available
at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf [hereinafter ECT]; North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., preamble, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
57
See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making, 28-32 (Nov. 2004)
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/trade_bits.pdf; Lawrence, J.C., Chicken Little Revisited: NAFTA Regulatory
Expropriations After Methanex, 41 GA. L. REV. 261 (2006); see also OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise
Affairs, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, (Sep. 2004),
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentpolicy/33776498.pdf (reviewing the broad range of views relating to the
interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment standard).
58
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, 16 ICSID Rev. 168, 5 ICSID Rep. 212, Merits (Aug. 30, 2000).
59
See, e.g., Gus Van Harten, The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Report for the
Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer Range Future, 43-53 (Nov. 2009),
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because they encourage foreign investors to initiate international litigation against governments
and expose them to the risk of costly awards.60 Thus, to the extent that governments see the
expansion of investor rights under IIAs as a risk, they will likely be all the more cautious about
implementing environmental policies that promote CMTs.61
The sorts of CMT policies that are most likely to be challenged are those that affect incumbents.
For example, an emissions standard that an existing facility can only meet by shutting down or
retrofitting for CCS may trigger a challenge on basis of alleged expropriation (or a measure
tantamount to expropriation) or a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard or the
national treatment standard. While much will depend on the facts (is the plant fully amortized,
were there any specific undertakings made in relation to emissions levels, are incumbents who
are foreign investors differentially treated?) the thrust of the civil society critique of IIAs is that
the mere threat of a challenge may cause governments to scale back on the level of their
ambition in dealing with carbon incumbents.
In some cases governments have taken measures to reduce the
interpretations of investment disciplines. For example, governments
language in new agreements62 or include explicit language that allows
what might otherwise be characterized as a breach by reference

risk of overly broad
can use more precise
governments to justify
to broad social and

http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009/11/Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf; see also M.A. Munro, Expropriating
Expropriation Law: The Implications of the Metalclad Decision on Canadian Expropriation Law and
Environmental Land-Use Regulation, 5 ASPER REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & TRADE LAW 75 (2005);
Anatole Boute, The Potential Contribution of International Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change,
27 JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 333, 335 (2009) (see articles cited at n.11); Stephan Schill,
Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New
Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L 57, 61-67 (2011-2012) (a useful recent review).
60
Harten, supra note 59, at 44-45.
61
This phenomenon – termed "regulatory chill" – has been the subject of many studies which have articulated
concerns that IIAs, including BITs and multilateral agreements such as NAFTA, constrain government efforts to
pursue a number of legitimate policy objectives, including: (i) the protection of health and the environment, (ii) the
preservation of natural resources (such as fresh water), (iii) climate change mitigation, (iv) the promotion of
economic development, (v) the regulation of utilities and delivery of government services, (vi) zoning decisions,
(vii) reforming health care, and (viii) regulating the financial sector. See, e.g., Howard Mann, International
Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities, Report for the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, (Feb. 2008), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia_business_human_rights.pdf;
V.L. Been & J.C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Misguided
Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2008); Jennifer Gerbasi & Mildred
Warner, Privatization, Public Goods, and the Ironic Challenge of Free Trade Agreements, 39 ADMINISTRATION &
SOCIETY 127 (2007); J. Cumming & R. Froehlich, NAFTA Chapter XI and Canada’s Environmental Sovereignty:
Investment Flows, Article 1110 and Alberta’s Water Act, 65 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 107 (2007); B.W. Jenkins,
The Next Generation of Chilling Uncertainty: Indirect Expropriation Under CAFTA and its Potential Impact on
Environmental Protection, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269 (2007); M.C. Porterfield, International Expropriation
Rules and Federalism, 4 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2004); C.M. Flood & T.D. Epps, Have We Traded Away the
Opportunity for Innovative Health Care Reform? The Implications of the NAFTA for Medicare, 47 MCGILL L.J. 747
(2002); J. Werksman, K.A. Baumert, & N.K. Dubash, Will International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate
Protection Policies?, Report for the World Resources Institute, (Apr. 2001) http://pdf.wri.org/investrules.pdf.
62
See, e.g., US Model BIT, supra note 56 (contains interpretive annexes designed to confirm the shared
understanding of the parties as to the scope of indirect expropriation and the customary law rules relating to the
minimum standard of treatment of aliens).
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environmental objectives.63 However, both of these measures speak to the future and new treaty
relations rather than existing treaty relations. For existing treaty relations, it is possible that the
parties may provide authoritative interpretive guidance as to the terms of the treaty.64
III.B. International Trade Law and Constraints on Subsidies for Carbon Management
Technologies
Governments have provided financial support for pilot CCS projects and funded research aimed
at capacity building as a way to promote climate policy for many years.65 Support of those
projects, as well as other projects promoting CMTs, could be considered a subsidy, and thereby
provoke a response from trading partners under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (ASCM).66 At one time, the ASCM contained provisions defining and exempting nonactionable subsidies, including those pertaining to research and development and the costs of
environmental regulation.67 But these provisions expired in 1999, and are now unenforceable.68
There is thus limited scope for justifying subsidization measures aimed at mitigating climate
change, including CMT-promoting policies. That said, there is some scope for governments to
dispute the applicability of the ASCM to their subsidization measures based on definitional
arguments. A discussion of a few possibilities follows.
III.B.1. Provision of Goods and Services in the Form of General Infrastructure
Article 1 of the ASCM provides that a subsidy is deemed to exist if there is a "financial
contribution by a government or any public body…whereby a benefit is conferred."69 A financial
contribution may include: (1) a direct transfer of funds, (2) a situation where a government
revenue that is otherwise due is forgone or not collected, and (3) a situation where a government
provides goods or services…or purchases goods. If a government attempts to make any of the
above contributions through a private entity, states can still challenge such contributions under
the ASCM.70
63

See,
e.g.,
Norway
Draft
Model
BIT,
footnote
to
art
3,
2007,
available
at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1031.pdf (dealing with the national treatment standard and
stipulating that: "The Parties agree/ are of the understanding that a measure applied by a government in pursuance of
legitimate policy objectives of public interest such as the protection of public health, safety and the environment,
although having a different effect on an investment or investor of another Party, is not inconsistent with national
treatment and most favoured nation treatment when justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to
rational policies not motivated by preference of domestic over foreign owned investment.").
64
The best known example of this approach is the Interpretive Note issued by the three NAFTA parties in relation to
the fair and equitable treatment standard in NAFTA Article 1105. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of
Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, (Jul. 31, 2001) http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=en&view=d; see also Methanex Corporation v. United
States of America, ¶¶ 20-21, 2005, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf (on the legal status of
the Note); RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 125 (2008)
(pointing out that the subsequent BIT practice of the US and Canada has followed this interpretation).
65
IEA Roadmap, supra note 32, at 11.
66
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter
ASCM].
67
Id. at art 8.2.
68
Hufbauer, supra note 3, at 34, 63-64.
69
ASCM, supra note 66, at art 1.1(a)(1).
70
ASCM, supra note 66, at art 1.1(a)(1)(iv).
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However, if a government provides goods or services in the form of general infrastructure, those
financial contributions are not considered subsidies as defined under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii),
making the ASCM inapplicable in those circumstances.71 The parameters of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii)
were recently explored in European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, a dispute in which the United States ("US") argued that
the governments of Germany, France, Spain and the United Kingdom subsidized the production
and marketing of large civil aircraft manufactured by Airbus.72 The US challenged infrastructure
and infrastructure-related grants to Airbus under Articles 1.1 and 2 of the ASCM. The measures
at issue included the provision of: (i) industrial sites; (2) access roads; (iii) lengthened runways;
and (iv) grants for the expansion and modernization of facilities in various locations throughout
the EC.73 In response, the EC argued that all these measures constituted "general infrastructure"
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) and were therefore not subsidies challengeable under
the ASCM.74
The Panel held that infrastructure is not inherently "general."75 Thus, in the Panel’s view
railroads, highways electrical distribution systems do not necessarily constitute "general
infrastructure" under the ASCM. Rather, such determinations must be made on a case-by-case
basis, "…taking into account the existence or absence of de jure or de facto limitations on access
or use, and any other factors that tend to demonstrate that the infrastructure was or was not
provided to or for the use of only a single entity or a limited group of entities."76 According to
the Panel, any number of factors may be examined including: (i) the circumstances surrounding
the creation of the infrastructure in question, (ii) consideration of the type of infrastructure, (iii)
the conditions and circumstances of the provision of the infrastructure, (iv) the recipients or
beneficiaries of the infrastructure, and (v) the legal regime applicable to such infrastructure,
including the terms and conditions of access to and/or limitations on use of the infrastructure.77
71

See ASCM, supra note 66, at art 1.1(a)(1)(iii) (the relevant portions of which state that "… a subsidy shall be
deemed to exist if:… a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods
…" [emphasis added]).
72
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (Jun. 30, 2010) [hereinafter EC-Aircraft Panel Report]; Appellate Body Report, European
Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 968,
WT/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011) [hereinafter EC-Aircraft AB Report].
73
See EC-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 7.1010, 7.1015, 7.1020 (where the US contended that
‘universal use’ should be the determining factor when deciding whether a government has provided goods or
services in the form of general infrastructure. In the US’ view, the mere fact that a government creates infrastructure
for reasons of public policy, to foster economic development, or to perform a public task should not result in the
categorization of that infrastructure being ‘general’. Similar arguments were made by third parties to the dispute
including Australia (at ¶¶ 7.1021-7.1022) and Brazil (at ¶ 7.1024)).
74
EC-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 7.1012, 7.1016-7.1019 (where the EC disputed the idea that
‘universal use’ of infrastructure as determinative of this issue and argued that infrastructure which benefits society
as a whole and promotes economic development policies should meet the definition of general infrastructure.
Similar arguments were made by Canada, a third party to the dispute, at ¶¶ 7.1025-7.1029).
75
EC-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 72, at ¶ 968 (on appeal, the Appellate Body re-characterized the nature of the
measures at issue as not relating specifically to infrastructure resulting in no need to make a determination as to the
application of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii). As a result, guidance can still be gleaned from the Panel’s decision interpreting
"general infrastructure" under that provision of the ASCM).
76
EC-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 72, at ¶ 7.1039.
77
EC-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 72, at ¶ 7.1039.
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In this case, the Panel determined that the provision of access roads were the only measures that
constituted permissible financial contributions in accordance with Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the
ASCM.78
How would a government-supported CCS project fare under this analysis? Based on the test set
out above, it seems unlikely that the definitional gap in the ASCM will provide governments
with much scope to dispute the applicability of that trade agreement to their CCS subsidies. One
interesting question might be whether government grants of pore space to CCS projects would
fall within the definition of a subsidy or whether such support would be deemed permissible in
accordance with Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the ASCM. For example, if a CCS project were designed
and operated on the basis of a "utility" model whereby access to the corresponding pore space
and infrastructure was available to all owners of CO2, then ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) would
render such a project permissable. If, on the other hand, a CCS project were designed and
operated with exclusive access rights, then Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the ASCM may be less likely
to apply.
III.B.2. Actionable Subsidies
Measures that fall within the definition of a "financial contribution" must still confer a benefit in
order to be deemed a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the ASCM. The subsidy must then be
"specific" to certain enterprises or industries.79 Once a measure has been found to be "specific",
it is necessary to determine whether that measure causes "adverse effects" to the interests of one
WTO member.80 If those preconditions are satisfied, the subsidy will be "actionable." Subsidies
that are contingent on exports or domestic content requirements are "prohibited" under the
ASCM.81 In those cases WTO law assumes that damage has been done to other economies. As a
result, proof of specificity and an "adverse effect" are not required.
III.B.2.a. Specificity
In some cases establishing specificity will be relatively easy; the granting authority or legislation
will expressly limit a subsidy’s access to certain enterprises. Other cases will be far less clear.
Under Article 2.1(b), specificity will not be established if eligibility of the subsidy is contingent
on "criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favor certain enterprises over others,
and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as number of employees or
size of enterprises." Some scholars have suggested that this provision could provide governments
with some policy space to pursue renewable energy goals.82 Still others have observed that
governments designing subsidies in accordance with the criteria outlined in Article 2.1(b) may

78

EC-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 72, at ¶¶ 7.1192-7.1196.
ASCM, supra note 66, at arts. 1.2, 2.
80
ASCM, supra note 66, at art. 5.
81
ASCM, supra note 66, at art. 3.
82
See, e.g., Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Resurrecting the Dead? The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering
Question of ‘Green Space’, 8 MANCHESTER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 2, 23-27 (2011)
[hereinafter Bigdeli, Resurrecting the Dead?] (Bigdeli has suggested an energy saving subsidy or subsidies for
consumers of renewable energy as examples of subsidies that could meet the requirements of Article 2.1(b)).
79
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still encounter problems under the ASCM.83 Given the prominence of the de facto analysis of
specificity, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the test of specificity would not be met.
Indeed, it appears that the specificity analysis under Article 2 of the ASCM inevitably has a
constraining effect on states trying to support environmental policies of any kind, let alone those
measures that would promote CMTs.84
III.B.2.b. Adverse Effects
Specific subsidies may be actionable only in circumstances where a WTO member suffers
adverse effects. Article 5 of the ASCM articulates a number of tests for determining when an
adverse effect has occurred, including: (i) injury to the domestic industry; (ii) nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other members (i.e. tariff concessions);
or (iii) serious prejudice to the interests of another member. Factors to consider when examining
whether a WTO member has suffered serious prejudice as a result of a subsidy are further
articulated in Article 6 of the ASCM. Subsidies may cause harm in a variety of ways, creating a
need for very fact-specific examinations of harm. Such case-by-case considerations suggest some
flexibility within the ASCM and perhaps provide governments with scope to support
environmental objectives, like the promotion of CMTs. For example, it seems possible that a
subsidy implemented to promote CMTs like a consumption subsidy or energy-saving subsidy,
which does not discriminate with respect to the origin of the energy or technology, may survive
the adverse effects analysis. Still, a government’s desire to manoeuver within this limited and
uncertain space will undoubtedly be determined by its willingness to assume the legal risks of
possible WTO litigation.
III.C. International Trade Law and Constraints on Regulations That Promote Carbon
Management Technologies
One option for addressing climate change available to governments is the straightforward
imposition of mandatory emission or energy efficiency standards on a product or production
process. Regulations usually outline specific GHG emission or energy efficiency levels or

83

Professor Rubini notes that despite strict compliance with Article 2.1(b), governments still face policy, and legal,
based hurdles when implementing renewable energy subsidies. Specifically, Professor Rubini notes that a subsidy in
compliance with Article 2.1(b) may still be found to be specific under Article 2.1(c) if there is evidence that the
subsidy de facto benefits certain enterprises or industries. In assessing whether a subsidy is de facto specific under
Article 2.1(c), WTO case law offers little guidance for governments designing their subsidy programs. While
something less than universal eligibility can lead to a finding of non-specificity, a large number of enterprises or
industries affected by a subsidy will not necessarily establish that it has general application. See Luca Rubini, Ain’t
Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space and Law Reform, 15
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 525, 548-549 (2012) [hereinafter Rubini, Subsidies for Renewable
Energy]; Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - Second Complaint, ¶
7.762, WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011); Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶¶ 7.115-7.122, WT/DS257R (Aug. 29, 2003).
84
See Rubini, Subsidies for Renewable Energy, supra note 83, at 548; TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ISSUES IN
PERSPECTIVE: FINAL REPORT AND SYNTHESIS OF DISCUSSIONS, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE SEMINAR,
COPENHAGEN, JUNE 18-20, 2008, 22 (Aaron Cosbey ed., 2008) [Cosbey, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE]; see also
HUFBAUER, supra note 3, at 61; EPPS, supra note 4, at 114-115 (many subsidies targeting climate change are likely
specific in that they are disproportionately accessed by certain industries).
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require the use of particular technology, such as CCS.85 One such regulation that has garnered
particular attention over the past year is the proposed European Fuel Quality Directive (EFQD).86
The proposed EFQD is one of the ways in which Europe hopes to meet its commitment to a 20%
reduction in carbon emissions by 2020.87 Specifically, the EFQD will require suppliers of
transport fuels to reduce the life cycle GHG intensity of their products by six percent by 2020,
relative to 2010 carbon emissions levels.88 To help achieve this goal, the EFQD differentiates
among transportation fuels based on the physical properties of the feedstock from which they are
produced. For example, fuels produced from shale oil and fuels produced from bitumen (i.e.
unconventional feedstocks) are distinguished from fuels derived from conventional oil. A
proposed implementation measure of the EFQD would allocate default GHG emission values to
transportation fuels based on the life cycle GHG intensity of each fuel’s feedstock source or
category.89 Those default values would then be used to determine whether European transport
fuel suppliers have met the EFQD’s six percent carbon emissions reduction target.
While the proposed EFQD could effectively reduce GHG emissions90 (and encourage the use of
CMTs), the proposed regulation has not received unanimous support. Earlier this year, the
Government of Canada took issue with distinctions made between unconventional and
conventional fuel sources under the EFQD and its implementing measure. In particular, Canada
has argued that by assigning Canadian oil sands crude a GHG intensity value that is higher than
that of other heavy crudes, the EFQD effectively precludes oil sands crude and any associated
products from the EU market.91
Using the EFQD as backdrop, the following discussion considers the elements that constrain
government policy space in the national treatment and necessity provisions of the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.92 Before delving into that discussion, however, it is
85

Note: there are other possible regulatory options that states may rely on including labeling requirements, domestic
emissions trading programs. Those regulatory options are not discussed in detail here.
86
See, e.g., Max Paris, EU delays ‘anti-oilsands’ fuel quality directive decision, CBC NEWS, Apr. 20, 2012,
available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/04/20/pol-fuel-directive-europe-canada.html (see also
related stories about the EFQD listed on that webpage); see also Matthew Ducharme, The European Fuel Quality
Directive: Will it Stay or Will it Go?, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY FACULTY OF LAW BLOG ON DEVELOPMENTS IN
ALBERTA LAW (Mar. 12, 2012) http://ablawg.ca/2012/03/12/the-european-fuel-quality-directive-will-it-stay-or-willit-go/.
87
Commissioner for Climate Action, The EU climate and energy package, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm.
88
Directive 2009/30/EC of The European Parliament and of The Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive
98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a mechanism to monitor and
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel
used by inland waterway vessels and repealing Directive 93/12/EEC, art. 7(a)(2), 2009 O.J. (L140/88).
89
EFQD Draft Directive, supra note 38.
90
See, e.g., P J Partington & Marc Huot, Briefing Note: Oilsands, heavy crudes, and the EU fuel-quality directive,
The Pembina Institute, (Mar. 2012), http://www.pembina.org/pub/2325.
91
Natural Resources Canada, Fuel Quality Directive: Backgrounder, (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media-room/news-release/2012/30a/6062 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
92
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995)
[hereinafter TBT]; here it is important to note that the TBT Agreement may pose other constraints on the space
afforded governments wanting to implement policies that would promote CMTs. For example, under the TBT
Agreement there are procedural requirements that states must adhere to when developing regulations. The
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necessary to make a preliminary observation about the national treatment disciplines in the TBT
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Agreements.93 There are significant
overlaps between the national treatment provisions of the TBT Agreement and GATT Article
III:4, leading to questions about the relationship between GATT and the TBT Agreement.94
WTO jurisprudence has done little to clarify that relationship.95 In more recent cases, the
Appellate Body has declined to make findings under Article III of GATT once a measure has
been found to be inconsistent with the TBT Agreement.96 Accordingly, it seems likely that if a
measure is challenged under both agreements, claims under the TBT Agreement will be
considered before claims made under GATT. As a result, the following discussion centers on the
TBT Agreement and posits that while the TBT Agreement recognizes that governments have the
right to implement regulatory measures like the EFQD,97 there remains a significant degree of
uncertainty regarding the validity of each specific measure and hence a corresponding risk that
such measure could be successfully challenged under the TBT Agreement.

III.C.1. National Treatment
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires "[m]embers [to] ensure that in respect of technical
regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin…." There are three elements
that must be established in order to find a violation of this provision, namely: (i) that the measure
at issue constitutes a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1, (ii) that the
imported products are "like" the domestic product and the products of other origin, and (iii) that
the treatment accorded to imported products is less favorable than that accorded to like domestic
products and like products from other countries.98
constraints posed by those aspects of the TBT Agreement are not discussed here. For an examination of those
aspects of the TBT Agreement, see Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO: How
Constraining are the Trade Rules?, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 143, 169-173 (2005)
[hereinafter Green, Climate Change].
93
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1986 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
94
Green, Climate Change, supra note 92, at 151-162 (observing that the same three issues must be addressed when
determining whether there is a violation of the national treatment provisions under GATT Article III:4 and the TBT
Agreement).
95
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, General Interpretive Note to Annex IA,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (in the event of a conflict, the provisions of agreements such as
the TBT Agreement prevail over GATT provisions).
96
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of
Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 406, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US-Tuna II AB Report]; see also
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sep. 26, 2002)
[hereinafter EC-Sardines AB Report].
97
See TBT, supra note 92, at preamble ¶ 6 (which states "…no country should be prevented from taking measures
necessary…for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of
deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate…"); GATT, supra note 93, at art. 1; see also Appellate
Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 61,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos AB Report] (where in the context of domestic
regulatory sovereign and health policy the AB stated that "it is undisputed that WTO members have the right to
determine the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation.").
98
Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 87,
WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012).
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III.C.1.a. Defining a Technical Regulation
The Appellate Body has outlined three characteristics that define whether a measure will be
considered a "technical regulation." Specifically, the measure at issue must: (i) apply to an
identifiable product or group of products either explicitly or implicitly, (ii) mandate the
characteristics, including the definable features, qualities, attributes or other distinguishing marks
of a product or group of products, and (iii) require mandatory compliance with the product
characteristics.99 Given this broad interpretation, most of a government’s regulatory measures
mandating emission or energy efficiency characteristics of a product, such as the EFQD, will
likely fall under the TBT Agreement.
III.C.1.b. Likeness
Once a measure is considered to be a "technical regulation" under Annex IA, Article 2.1 of the
TBT Agreement links a state’s national treatment obligation to the concept of "likeness".
Specifically, Article 2.1 provides that a government’s non-discrimination obligation only relates
to "like" products. While GATT jurisprudence has considered the concept of "likeness,"100 the
interpretive analysis to be used under the TBT has only recently been clarified, with the WTO
Panel in US – Tuna II adopting the test for likeness that is used in GATT Article III:4.101 As a
result, the likeness of products will be informed by: (i) the product’s physical properties, (ii)
product’s end-uses, (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits in relation to the products and (iv) the
international tariff classification.102 The analysis of likeness under Article 2.1 will focus on
whether there is a competitive relationship between imported and domestic products.103
That emphasis on competition as a fundamental quality of likeness has, however, been criticized
on the grounds that it places unnecessary constraints on a government’s policy space. The test for
"likeness" under Article III:4 ignores the economic theory of regulation, which suggests that
governments tend to implement regulations when consumers do not differentiate between goods
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that the government considers distinguishable.104 It might be possible to argue that such concerns
were addressed in EC-Asbestos, where the Appellate Body took health risks into account when
considering the "likeness" of certain goods.105 However, where such arguments can be made (e.g.
that products are not like because the attributes of one product is associated with health or
environmental risks while the attributes of the other good do not have similar consequences),
evidence of consumer tastes and habits is still relevant to determinations of "likeness."106
Consequently, products may still be considered "like" if they pose different health or
environmental risks and there is evidence that consumers do not consider those factors relevant
when behaving in the market.107
In the case of the EFQD, a likeness analysis would undoubtedly be complicated and based on a
number of factors, including: (i) the fuels being compared, including the physical properties of
the corresponding feedstocks, (ii) the fuel’s end-uses, (iii) market evidence (if any) of consumer
tastes and habits regarding different types of fuel, and (iv) the tariff classifications given to the
fuels being compared. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complete likeness
analysis, other than to note that the EU would want any likeness analysis to compare fuels that
are more easily distinguishable in terms of their GHG emissions intensity, density and viscosity.
For example, the EU may be more comfortable with a likeness analysis that compares bitumen
with conventional crude oil as such a comparison is more likely to support the distinctions it has
made between fuels in the EFQD and its implementing measure. In contrast, should Canada
challenge a measure like the EFQD, it will want to argue for a likeness analysis that compares
fuels that are more similar (i.e. heavy crude and bitumen) to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of
the differentiations made between fuels under the EFQD. It is uncertain, however, which
approach a WTO dispute settlement body would take in examining the likeness of fuels for the
purpose of determining whether the EFQD complies with international trade law. It is this
uncertainty that may have a constraining effect on a government’s ability to implement policies
like the EFQD, which promote the use of CMTs. As observed above in the context of
subsidization for CMTs, a government’s willingness to operate within the ambiguities of this
aspect of the TBT Agreement will undoubtedly relate, in part, to its willingness take on the risks
associated with those uncertainties (i.e. litigation challenging their regulation at the WTO).
III.C.1.c. No Less Favourable Treatment
If domestic and imported products are found to be "like," a WTO Panel or Appellate Body will
consider whether the imported product is accorded treatment "no less favorable" than the
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See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau & Joel Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 811, 818 (2002).
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Id. at ¶¶ 113-126.
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The recent US-Tuna II WTO decisions arguably go further than this by finding that distinctions made in
regulations about the labeling of tuna products based on different fishing methods (some more harmful to dolphins
than others) used to catch tuna had no bearing on the "likeness" of tuna products, despite an established consumer
preference for products with the ‘dolphin-safe’ label, see US-Tuna II AB Report, supra note 96, at ¶ 233.
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domestic product.108 Similar to the analysis of non-discrimination seen in GATT Article III:4,
formal regulatory distinctions or differences in treatment between imported and domestic goods
are not enough to violate TBT Article 2.1. Rather, the analysis centers on whether: (i) a
government’s measure adversely modifies the conditions of competition for imported products
vis-à-vis domestic goods and (ii) the detrimental impact of that measure reflects
discrimination.109 Thus, determinations of whether there is "less favorable treatment" under TBT
Article 2.1 are undoubtedly fact-specific with WTO dispute settlement bodies considering the
scope and structure of a government’s regulatory measure to determine if the distinctions made
between imported and domestic goods adversely impact imports. What remains unclear,
however, is whether a violation of the "less favorable treatment" standard will be found only in
cases where there is evidence of a government’s protectionist intent or whether violations will be
found regardless of a government’s legitimate intentions, such as protecting the environment.
As is true of the adverse effects analysis under the ASCM Agreement, such case-by-case
considerations can evince a certain amount of flexibility within the TBT Agreement for
governments to pursue their environmental policy goals through regulations like the EFQD.
Indeed, such an examination may also be beneficial in rooting out hidden protectionist goals.110
On the other hand, a government’s desire to manoeuver within this uncertain space will
undoubtedly be informed by its willingness to entertain the legal risks that a WTO body would
question the legitimacy of their regulatory goals.111 Current WTO jurisprudence considering
Article 2.1 appears to support the proposition that the "less favorable treatment test" may have a
more constraining effect on the choices available to governments when implementing regulatory
measures for environmental purposes. In the recently decided US-Tuna II, US regulations
regarding dolphin-safe labeling were found to discriminate against Mexican Tuna despite the fact
that one of the objectives pursued by the US measure was the protection of dolphins.112 That
finding in US-Tuna II suggests that even a finding that one of the goals of the EFDQ is to reduce
GHG emission would not be sufficient to overcome the less favorable treatment test under TBT
Article 2.1.
III.C.2. Necessity
In addition to Article 2.1, measures must also be consistent with article 2.2 of the TBT
Agreement, which authorizes WTO members to implement technical regulations so long as they
are "not…more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective," with the
108
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protection of the environment expressly recognized as a legitimate objective.113 While WTO
members are able to set their own level of protection,114 the analysis under this provision
involves the balancing of a number of considerations, including: (i) the contribution made by the
measure at issue to a government’s legitimate objective, (ii) the trade-restrictiveness of the
measure at issue, and (iii) the importance of the objective and the gravity of consequences that
would arise from non-fulfillment of the objective.115
Central to this balancing test is the type of evidence a state will need to show it has relied upon in
making certain regulatory decisions. Unlike the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement), which requires a scientific basis for government
measures intended to protect human, plant or animal health,116 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement
indicates that when assessing risks, relevant considerations include available "scientific and
technical information." Admittedly less onerous than the requirement for scientific evidence
under the SPS Agreement,117 the standard of proof that a WTO Panel or Appellate Body will
impose upon governments wanting to promote CMTs will be key to a determination of the
validity of measures under the TBT Agreement. If the need for scientific evidence under the TBT
is rigorously required by WTO dispute settlement bodies, states will have less policy space to
implement environmental measures aimed at combating climate change. If, on the other hand, a
less onerous approach is accepted regarding the need for scientific evidence as a basis for a
government’s regulatory decisions, then it seems clear that there will be more policy space for
states to implement environmental measures for the purpose of climate change mitigation.118
As with many analyses in international trade law, determining whether measures like the EFQD
would survive a challenge under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement depends on how a WTO
panel or the Appellate Body assesses a number of factors. In challenging the EFQD, Canada is
likely to present scientific evidence questioning the GHG intensity values assigned to
unconventional and conventional fuel sources under the EFQD. Additionally, Canada may tender
scientific evidence that questions whether a measure aimed at GHG emissions from different
transportation fuels is even able to meaningfully contribute to the mitigation of climate change.
In the face of what it considers tenuous scientific evidence, Canada will argue that the EFQD is
too trade-restrictive because it effectively bans unconventional fuels from the EU market. In
support of its measure, the EU is likely to argue that the EFQD contributes to the reduction of
GHG emissions and thereby fulfills a legitimate environmental objective – climate change
mitigation. In support of this contention, Europe will point to scientific evidence that speaks to
the existence of climate change as a global challenge and the consequences that will arise if
113
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governments do not implement measures to address this problem.119 As part of this discussion,
the EU would likely tender evidence supporting the distinctions made between different transport
fuels under the EFQD. Thus, the EU would further argue that its measure is an appropriate step
toward climate change mitigation without being unduly trade restrictive. How a WTO dispute
settlement body will weigh all of these arguments, however, remains uncertain, and as noted
above, this uncertainty may have a constraining effect on a government’s ability to implement
policies like the EFQD. The greater the latitude a government exercises in regulating, the greater
the risk that such regulations will be challenged under the TBT Agreement.
III.C.3. Justifying Measures that Promote Carbon Management Technologies
Despite constraints on CMT-promoting policies, a government may be able to avail itself of
justification provisions within WTO law. The most obvious example is Article XX of the
GATT.120 Article XX explicitly recognizes that trade concerns will not always take priority over
other legitimate public policy objectives like protecting the environment.121 In so doing, Article
XX gives practical meaning to the aspirations of the WTO, which make reference to the
international trade law regime as a means by which countries may promote the sustainable
development of world resources and protect the environment.122 Whether Article XX can be used
as a mechanism for the promotion of such goals in relation to measures falling under WTO
agreements other than GATT is a heavily debated proposition.123 The nuances of those
arguments are outside the scope of this paper except to note that if Article XX is inapplicable
beyond GATT, governments trying to implement climate change mitigation measures subject to
other WTO agreements like the ASCM and TBT Agreements will likely have a more constrained
policy space within which to work. The following discussion proceeds on the assumption that
Article XX has some applicability to government subsidies and regulations intended to promote
CMTs.
A WTO panel or the Appellate Body will analyze a government measure intended to promote
CMTs under Article XX in two steps. It will first determine if the measure falls within one of the
specified exceptions under Article XX. If the measure can tentatively be justified on the basis of
one of those exceptions, it is then examined under the Chapeau of Article XX.124 Early
jurisprudence considering environmental measures interpreted Article XX narrowly, making it
difficult for governments to justify their environmental measures within the trade law regime.125
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More recent jurisprudence suggests that the international trade law regime is increasingly
recognizing the need for governments to have some policy space to implement environmental
measures (such as those related to the promotion of CMTs) and be able to justify those measures
under Article XX. As discussed below, WTO dispute settlement bodies have been more willing
to apply Article XX to measures that have environmental policy objectives and have relaxed
their interpretation of the "necessity" requirement under Article XX(b). Nevertheless, aspects of
the Article XX analysis remain difficult to overcome and are therefore likely to have a
constraining effect on a government’s environmental policy space.
III.C.3.a. Environmental Policy Objectives Under Article XX(b) and XX(g)
Articles XX contains two justifications relevant to environmental policy objectives, including the
promotion of CMTs. Article XX(b) permits a WTO member to maintain otherwise GATT-illegal
measures if doing so is ‘necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.’ In contrast,
Article XX(g) allows a WTO member state to justify measures that ‘relat[e] to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources’ if such measures are ‘made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.’ Significantly, measures addressing
environmental policy concerns including climate change126 and the protection of clean air as an
exhaustible natural resource127 have been recognized as measures that may be covered by GATT
Articles XX(b) and XX(g) respectively. Thus, in contrast to earlier jurisprudence which tended
to focus on the trade implications of a measure without regard to its environmental objectives,
the current case law examining Articles XX(b) and XX(g) appears to strike more of a balance
between the goals of trade liberalization and environmental protection. As a result, it seems
possible that a measure focused on the promotion of CMTs could be provisionally justified under
either (or both) Articles XX(b) and XX(g).128

III.C.3.b. Necessity & Relatedness Under Articles XX(b) and XX(g)
The crucial language in Articles XX(b) and XX(g) are "necessary to" and "relating to." The
analysis under XX(b) is stricter than that the analysis under XX(g). For a time, "necessity" under
Article XX(b) was stringently interpreted. WTO panels found that measures could only be
justified under this provision if they were the least trade restrictive measures reasonably
available to a state.129 More recently, the Appellate Body has expanded upon this analysis and
determined that the current test for "necessity" promotes the weighing and balancing of number
of factors, including: (i) the contribution made by the (non-indispensable) measure to a
Tuna (EEC) Panel Report] (where the Panel determined that same measure challenged in US – Tuna I Panel Report
could not be justified under Articles XX(b) or XX(g) because essential conditions of these provisions were not met).
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Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.46, WT/DS332/R (Jun. 12, 2007).
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government’s legitimate objective; (ii) the importance of the common interests or values
protected; and (iii) the impact of the measure on trade.130 While the analysis under Article XX(g)
and its "relatedness" requirement is less stringent than "necessity" under Article XX(b), a
government justifying its measures under Article XX(g) will still need to demonstrate a "close
and genuine relationship of ends and means" which is not "disproportionately wide in its scope
and reach".131 Additionally, so long as the measure is even handed in relation to domestic
measures, the ‘effective in conjunction’ requirement should be met.132
III.C.3.c. Article XX Chapeau
A measure that can provisionally be justified under one of Article XX’s subparagraphs must still
be considered under the Article XX chapeau. Established to prevent states from abusing the
Article XX exceptions, the chapeau is considered by some as "the most important provision in
[GATT]."133 Under the chapeau a measure must not be applied "in a manner that constitutes a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail" and must not be "a disguised restriction on trade."
In contrast to the analysis that takes place under Article XX’s subparagraphs, an examination of
measures aimed at the promotion of CMTs under the chapeau focuses on the measures’ "detailed
operating provisions" and "how [they are] actually applied."134 As a result, the chapeau requires a
WTO member to provide evidence justifying any differential treatment of, and/or among, its
trading partners.135
Here it is important to note that "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" as contemplated by
the chapeau is analytically distinct from discrimination under the Most Favored Nation and
National Treatment provisions of GATT.136 In contrast to GATT Articles I and III, which require
that a WTO member’s measure have a uniform effect on all trading partners, an analysis of
unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination under the chapeau necessarily requires consideration of a
measure’s diverse effects on "countries where the same conditions prevail." As a result, measures
promoting the use of CMTs will have a greater chance of surviving justification under the
chapeau if they fairly and predictably make adjustments for countries with comparable climate
policies and for countries at different stages of economic development.137 Whether a WTO
130
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member has taken into account the special needs of its trading partners and can thereby justify
such a measure under the chapeau will depend on whether: (1) its measure requires a foreign
country to adopt its own policies; (2) it has attempted to engage in negotiations with its trading
partners with a view to concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements; and (3) the
implementation and administration of its measure respects basic fairness and due process.138
To date, chapeau justifications have not been very successful.139 For example, in US-Gasoline,
the Appellate Body did not accept that a uniform pollutant baseline for importers and an
individualized pollutant baseline for domestic refiners was justifiable on the grounds that
administrative difficulty and domestic hardship required the differing treatment of domestic and
foreign industry. Similarly, in US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that a requirement permitting
the marketing of shrimp only if caught by a vessel equipped with a Turtle Excluder Device could
not overcome the Article XX Chapeau for a number of reasons including: (i) differing
technology phase-in periods, (ii) the rigidity and inflexibility of the measure which recognized
only one way of avoiding turtle harm, (iii) and the lack of a transparent and predictable
certification process under the measure.140 More recently, in Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, the
Appellate Body determined that while a Brazilian regulation banning the import of retreaded
tires was necessary for the "reduction of the risks of waste tyre accumulation"141 it was arbitrary
and unjustified because the measure contained an exception for imports from other MERCOSUR
Member States.142
IV. How International Investment Law and International Trade Law May Promote
Carbon Management Technologies
While international trade law and international investment law are most often viewed as posing
barriers to the adoption of environmental measures, an important theme of this article is that
international trade law and international investment law can also serve to promote or protect
measures with environmental objectives such as the promotion of CMT.
IV.A. Protection of Carbon Management Technologies Under International Investment Law
International investment law may help protect investors in CMT industries by guaranteeing a
stable regulatory climate within which those investors operate. International investment law can
reinforce the effectiveness of carbon management policies by forcing states to respect
commitments that they made as part of persuading an investor to adopt an expensive technology
such as CCS or VFF. As noted above, commitments might include a direct subsidy to these
CMTs and/or a commitment to assume the long-term liability, an issue of particular importance
for CCS. Budget pressures may tempt states to renege on promises of public support once the
investments have been made and costs are "sunk."143 Or a new government in office may seek to
change the policies of a previous government, perhaps seeking to invest more in renewables and
138
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conservation at the expense of CCS. The long-term nature and political sensitivity of upstream
energy investments means that they may be particularly vulnerable to regulatory and political
risks. The disciplines or standards incorporated in International Investment Agreements (IIAs)
offer investors some protection against these risks. The most important standards for present
purposes are these: the duty not to expropriate directly or indirectly except upon payment of
compensation, the national treatment standard, the minimum standard of treatment or the fair and
equitable treatment standard, the umbrella clause or the promise to fulfill commitments made to
investors.
In each case, the investor will need to establish that it is an investor within the meaning of the
relevant treaty who has made an investment also within the meaning of the treaty.144 However,
the typical IIA defines investor and investment very broadly so that investors in CMTs in the
energy sector are likely to fall within this definition.145 The investment regime of the Energy
Charter Treaty, while similarly broad,146 is exceptional in that it is limited to "any investment
associated with an "economic activity in the energy sector."147 However, CCS investments will
likely fall within that scope. Indeed, the Energy Charter Secretariat considers that CCS is part of
the "energy cycle."148 Carbon dioxide capture, its transportation by pipelines, and its storage can,
according to the Energy Charter Secretariat, be certified as being Economic Activities in the
Energy Sector.149 More generally, the Secretariat argues that "[carbon dioxide] may be taken
within the coverage of the term ‘energy related activity.’"150
It seems unlikely that the withdrawal of a CMT subsidy or the refusal to honor a transfer of
liability for carbon storage will violate the expropriation standard of IIAs. This is because
arbitral awards have set the threshold for what counts as an expropriation at a very high level.151
144
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Moreover, the withdrawal of a subsidy is unlikely to destroy the "entire" value of a CMT
investment in the upstream energy sector.152 Nor is the withdrawal of subsidies likely to be
deemed a violation of the national treatment standard unless it targets foreign investors ex facie
or as a matter of practice. A general refusal to observe commitments of support will not allow
foreign investors to rely on the national treatment standard.153
However, the fair and equitable treatment standard (FET) provides for an absolute standard of
investment protection, irrespective of the treatment accorded to other investors. Subsidies for
CMT investments create incentives that aim to stimulate private investment in the deployment of
carbon reduction technologies in the upstream energy sector. CCS investors, for instance, build
their business cases on the basis of these subsidy promises. They invest in reliance upon the
faithful implementation of support commitments made by host states. Absent a revenue stream
from CCS or a sufficiently high carbon price, public support is a conditio sine qua non of CCS
investments.154 The fair and equitable treatment standard could therefore provide important
guarantees of protection against a state reneging on the arrangements it has made to attract CCS
investments.155
Another way in which international investment law may protect CMT project investment is
through umbrella clauses. The umbrella clause of an IIA (if it has one) commits the host state to
observe promises made to an investor.156 It serves to internationalize what might otherwise be a
simple breach of contract which must be litigated in the domestic courts of the host state.157 The
umbrella clause in the Energy Charter Treaty provides that "Each Contracting Party shall observe
any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other
border line towards expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession taking or control over the enterprise
the disputed measures entail. In the present case, there is no possession taking of Windau or its assets, no
interference with the shareholder’s rights or with the management’s control over and running of the enterprise –
apart from ordinary regulatory provisions laid down in the production licence, the off-take agreement, etc.").
152
For CCS projects, for instance, the operator will remain in control of the various facilities in the CCS chain from
the point of capture to the point of injection. The capture facility whether a power plant or a bitumen upgrader will
still provide some revenue.
153
LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 147 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Energy Corp.]; see also Noble Ventures,
Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 180 (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Nobel Ventures].
154
Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, A Low-Carbon Electricity Sector for the UK: Issues and
Options, in DELIVERING A LOW-CARBON ELECTRICITY SYSTEM – TECHNOLOGIES, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 278, 300
(Michael Grubb, Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt eds., 2008) (according to Grubb, Jamasb, and Pollitt, "[p]ublic
support for the . . . development and deployment of new technologies and industries to reduce emissions is vital.");
Letter from Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change to D. José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on the Proposed
Retroactive Reduction of 661 Tariff for Existing Investments (Jun. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.iigcc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/1009/IIGCC-letter-to-Spanish-government.pdf.
155
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon
Economy, UN Doc UNCTAD/WIR/2010, 137 (2010).
156
See A.C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection, 20
ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 411 (2004); see also OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment
Agreements (Oct., 2006) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/20/37579220.pdf; see also Thomas W. Wälde, Contract
Claims under the Energy Charter Treaty’s Umbrella Clause: Original Intentions versus Emerging Jurisprudence, in
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 205 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006) (for discussions of
the history of the clause).
157
See Gabriellle Kaufmann-Kohler, Introduction – Treaty versus Contract Claims, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 201 (Clarisse Ribeiro ed., 2006).
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Contracting Party."158 An umbrella clause only protects commitments made by the state or a state
entity.
In the case of CCS there may be a number of direct contractual relations between the state and
the operator of a CCS project. For example, if the target pore space is vested in the state (as it
typically will be outside the United States), the legal arrangement under which an operator
acquires the rights by licence or lease to use the pore space may be the source of obligations
owed by the State to the investor.159 Similarly, if the state provides financial support to the CCS
proponent, the legal arrangements for that commitment whether by contract or otherwise will
likewise be protected.
It will not be possible to establish a breach of the umbrella clause in the situation where the
"commitment" simply takes the form of the legislative scheme as it stands at the time of the
investment. For example, if the legislation provides for the transfer of liability from the operator
to the government after site closure and a period of stabilization the subsequent repeal of that
legislation will not be a breach of an umbrella clause absent some further facts that shows that
the host state had "entered into" an "obligation" not to repeal the transfer of liability.160
IV.B. Promoting Carbon Management Technologies Under International Trade Law
Somewhat overlooked is the potential of international trade law to support the implementation of
CMT-promoting policies. International trade law provides a framework for trade in goods that
include CMTs and CMT parts and components. To the extent that international trade in CMTs,
CMT technologies, and CMT parts and components furthers the development of CMTs, the
liberalization of trade in these areas is a boon to CMTs. Recent trade negotiations have included
attempts to reduce tariff rates on environmental goods. For example, the World Trade
Organization supports negotiations aimed at reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers
to environmental goods and services.161 Certain regional or bilateral initiatives, such as the
Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, eliminate tariffs on environmental goods.162 The
recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting outlined an environmental
goods list for liberalization as part of the participants’ move to meet green goals.163
158

ECT, supra note 56, at art. 10 (states were permitted to make a reservation to the umbrella clause of Article 10.
Four states did so of which three have never gone on to ratify the treaty (Norway, Canada and Australia)); see also
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005); CMS Gas
Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment Proceeding (Sep. 25, 2007)
[hereinafter CMS Gas] (the US\Argentina BIT at issue in a number of arbitrations including these two similarly
provided that each Party "shall observe any obligations it may have entered into with regard to investments").
159
See, e.g., Mines and Minerals Act, RSA 2000, c M-17 (Can.).
160
CMS Gas, supra note 158, at ¶ 89 (the Ad Hoc Committee observed that the word "obligations" must mean legal
obligations and that "Although legitimate expectations might arise by reason of a course of dealings between the
investor and the host State, these are not, as such, legal obligations, though they may be relevant to the application
of the fair and equitable treatment clause contained in the BIT.").
161
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶31(iii),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
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Nimbona, supra note 47.
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APEC Leaders Cinch Environmental Goods List, 12 BRIDGES TRADE BIORES (Sep. 13, 2012), available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/144620/?utm_content=ndbankes%40ucalgary.ca&utm_source=VerticalResponse&utm
_medium=Email&utm_term=APEC%20Leaders%20Clinch%20Environmental%20Goods%20List&utm_campaign
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International trade negotiations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) also provide a
potential mechanism to support CMT-promoting technologies. With Canada’s entry into the
TPP, most of the key economies in the Pacific region are now participants,164 and a critical mass
now exists for consideration of global climate issues in the TPP negotiations. Because the TPP
negotiations have not been transparent, it is not known what, if anything, the governments have
discussed regarding trade and climate change. But climate policy is too important to be left out.
TPP will likely provide opportunities to form partnerships among governments, business, and
NGOs in the trans-Pacific region. This is particularly important for CMTs, as these types of
partnerships may provide the needed scale for CMTs to fully develop.
Also presenting an opportunity to promote CMTs under international trade law is potential
amendment of the ASCM to revive an exemption for “non-actionable” subsidies. As discussed in
section III above, the ASCM constrains CMT-promoting policies by prohibiting certain subsidies
or making them actionable. Under Article 2, "non-specific" subsidies are non-actionable, the
only remaining category of non-actionable subsidies in the ASCM.165 But before 1999, the
ASCM recognized other non-actionable subsidies,166 including subsidies pertaining to research
and development167 and the costs of environmental regulation.168 Since the expiration of those
=News%20Digest%20%7c%20Canada%20Announces%20About%20Face%20on%20Controversial%20Asbestos%
20Stancecontent.
164
Trans-Pacific partners invite Canada to the table: Canada to join trade talks with Asia-Pacific nations, CBC
NEWS, Jun. 19, 2012, available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/06/19/pol-g20-harper-obama-tppmexico.html.
165
ASCM, supra note 66, at art. 2.
166
Id. at arts. 8-9 (which have been unenforceable since 1999 when countries could not reach a consensus on their
extension).
167
Id. at art. 8(2)(a) [footnotes omitted] states:
8(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies shall be non-actionable:
(a) assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or research establishments on a
contract basis with firms if: the assistance covers not more than 75 percent of the costs of industrial research or
50 percent of the costs of pre-competitive development activity; and provided that such assistance is limited
exclusively to:
(i) costs of personnel (researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employed exclusively in the
research activity);
(ii) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and permanently (except when
disposed of on a commercial basis) for the research activity;
(iii) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity, including
bought-in research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.;
(iv) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity;
(v) other running costs (such as those of materials, supplies and the like), incurred directly as a result of the
research activity.
168

Id. at art. 8(2)(c) [footnotes omitted] reads as follows:
8(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies shall be non-actionable:
[…]
(c) assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law
and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms, provided that the
assistance:
(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and
(ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of adaptation; and
(iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully borne by
firms; and
(iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does
not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and
(v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes.
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provisions, the policy space afforded governments to support R&D geared toward the creation of
CMTs or to support the adaptation of facilities using CMTs has diminished. As a result, WTO
governments might consider re-enacting, or perhaps revising those provisions within the
ASCM.169
IV.C. Carbon Pricing and Border Tax Adjustments
As noted above, carbon pricing is a central policy to the promotion of CMT, but is so thoroughly
treated elsewhere, that this article will not discuss it in detail. But to highlight how international
trade law may aid in the development and continuing viability of CMTs, we briefly mention a
way in which international trade law may provide a crucial support for carbon pricing.
Unilateral carbon pricing proposals invariably give rise to concerns about impacts of industries
in a carbon pricing jurisdiction, vis-à-vis industries in jurisdictions that do not price carbon.170 In
order to address the issues of competitiveness losses and emissions leakage that could result from
a unilateral carbon pricing, analysts and policy makers have proposed the imposition of border
tax adjustments.171 A border tax adjustment is a duty levied by a country adopting some carbon
pricing scheme, on a country that does not have a carbon pricing scheme, the purpose being to
equalize the regulatory cost burden among trading partners. Alternatively, a border tax
adjustment can take the form of a subsidy for a good exported from a country adopting carbon
pricing to one that does not.
These measures have proved controversial since they could be used to protect domestic industry,
an effect that is prohibited under international trade law.172 However, it is possible that a border
tax adjustment would not run afoul of international trade rules, and would in fact be a vital
mechanism for a country considering a carbon tax but wary of the competitiveness implications
for its domestic industries. The implications of carbon pricing and border carbon adjustments
169

For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages associated with resurrecting the non-actionable subsidy
provisions in the ASCM see Rubini, Subsidies for Renewable Energy, supra note 83 (where Professor Rubini argues
that what is needed in the ASCM is new rules that would expressly permit subsides for renewable energy); Bigdeli,
Resurrecting the Dead?, supra note 82 (where the author concludes that reviving and expanding upon the nonactionable subsidies provisions in the ASCM should be coupled with procedural improvements regarding
transparency, proportionality and abuse prevention as a way of monitoring government subsidization measures); see
also Robert Howse, Climate Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis, (May 2010),
available at http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1275 (where Professor Howse suggests that a
reconceptualization of non-actionable subsidies based on the range of policies listed in the Kyoto Protocol as
appropriate policies for the implementation of Kyoto commitments).
170
See M. Scott Taylor, Unbundling the pollution haven hypothesis, 4 BE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS &
POLICY 3 (2005) (the notion that emissions intensive industries will move to less stringently regulated countries as a
result of environmental policy is known as the `pollution haven hypothesis’, and has been tested using theoretical
and empirical models. A related concern is emissions leakage: if pollution intensive activities simply shift from one
jurisdiction to another as a result of a carbon price, then (for a global pollutant like CO2) there may be no net
environmental improvement as a result of the policy).
171
See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (died, passed House)
(the proposed US climate bill included provisions supporting the eventual implementation of border tax
adjustments).
172
CCS Industry Roadmap, supra note 9, at 5; International Energy Agency, A Policy Strategy for Carbon Capture
and Storage: Information Paper, 8 (Jan., 2012); Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and
Storage, 94, 98 (Aug. 2010) http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/sequestration/ccstf/CCSTaskForceReport2010.pdf.
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have been discussed at length by others173 and are not discussed at length here, except to point
out that this aspect of trade law may support carbon pricing after all. Thus, a country promoting
CCS would be well-advised to complement CCS-promoting policies with carbon pricing to
provide some price stability and long-term economic viability for CCS projects. If so, a border
tax adjustment that is consistent with trade rules could prevent the leakage feared to take place
when a country unilaterally adopts carbon pricing.
V. Conclusion
In our view, a first-best solution would be the imposition of a carbon price that uniformly applies
across all emitters. Not only does carbon pricing seem politically challenging, but even if a
carbon price is adopted, CMTs will likely require policies in addition to carbon pricing to
support development. The strategic, political, and economic importance of CMTs calls for a
discussion of policy levers to promote CMTs, and the international trade and investment law
implications of these policy levers. The focus in this paper has been on CMTs in the upstream
energy production sectors, though the analysis in this paper has wide application across a number
of different emitting industries and countries.
The analysis undertaken in this article illustrates how international trade and international
investment law act to constrain a variety of environmental measures, including CMT-promoting
policies. This is unsurprising, given the long-standing tension between environmental concerns
and trade concerns. However, it is possible to overstate this tension, and overlook opportunities
to invoke international trade or international investment law to advance or protect CMTpromoting policies. The view of international trade and international investment law as
unambiguously constraining green policy space is thus simplistic and misleading. A number of
tools and possible tools that draw on international trade law or international investment law may
be used to promote CMTs, or advance CMT-promoting policies. International trade law and
international investment law has always tolerated well-drafted environmental measures, and
supporting CMTs with well-drafted legislation and regulation should similarly avoid running
afoul of international trade or international investment law.
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